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Abstract
Training generative adversarial networks (GAN) using too little data typically leads
to discriminator overfitting, causing training to diverge. We propose an adaptive
discriminator augmentation mechanism that significantly stabilizes training in
limited data regimes. The approach does not require changes to loss functions
or network architectures, and is applicable both when training from scratch and
when fine-tuning an existing GAN on another dataset. We demonstrate, on several
datasets, that good results are now possible using only a few thousand training
images, often matching StyleGAN2 results with an order of magnitude fewer
images. We expect this to open up new application domains for GANs. We also
find that the widely used CIFAR-10 is, in fact, a limited data benchmark, and
improve the record FID from 5.59 to 2.67.
1 Introduction
The increasingly impressive results of generative adversarial networks (GAN) [13, 30, 29, 5, 18,
19, 20] are fueled by the seemingly unlimited supply of images available online. Still, it remains
challenging to collect a large enough set of images for a specific application that places constraints
on subject type, image quality, geographical location, time period, privacy, copyright status, etc.
The difficulties are further exacerbated in applications that require the capture of a new, custom
dataset: acquiring, processing, and distributing the ∼ 105 − 106 images required to train a modern
high-quality, high-resolution GAN is a costly undertaking. This curbs the increasing use of generative
models in fields such as medicine [44]. A significant reduction in the number of images required
therefore has the potential to considerably help many applications.
The key problem with small datasets is that the discriminator overfits to the training examples; its
feedback to the generator becomes meaningless and training starts to diverge [2, 45]. In almost all
areas of deep learning [38], dataset augmentation is the standard solution against overfitting. For
example, training an image classifier under rotation, noise, etc., leads to increasing invariance to these
semantics-preserving distortions — a highly desirable quality in a classifier [16, 8, 9]. In contrast,
a GAN trained under similar dataset augmentations learns to generate the augmented distribution
[47, 49]. In general, such “leaking” of augmentations to the generated samples is highly undesirable.
For example, a noise augmentation leads to noisy results, even if there is none in the dataset.
In this paper, we demonstrate how to use a wide range of augmentations to prevent the discriminator
from overfitting, while ensuring that none of the augmentations leak to the generated images. We
start by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the conditions that prevent the augmentations from
leaking. We then design a diverse set of augmentations, and an adaptive control scheme that enables
the same approach to be used regardless of the amount of training data, properties of the dataset, or
the exact training setup (e.g., training from scratch or transfer learning [31, 41, 42, 32]).
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(a) Convergence of FFHQ (256× 256) (b) Discriminator outputs, 50k (c) Discriminator outputs, 20k
Figure 1: (a) Convergence with different training set sizes. “140k” means that we amplified the 70k
dataset by 2× through x-flips; we do not use data amplification in any other case. (b,c) Evolution of
discriminator outputs during training. Each vertical slice shows a histogram of D(x), i.e., raw logits.
We demonstrate, on several datasets, that good results are now possible using only a few thousand
images, often matching StyleGAN2 results with an order of magnitude fewer images. Furthermore,
we show that the popular CIFAR-10 benchmark suffers from limited data: our procedure achieves a
new record Fréchet inception distance (FID) [17] of 2.67, significantly improving over the current
state of the art of 5.59 [48]. We also present METFACES, a high-quality benchmark dataset for limited
data scenarios. We will make our implementation, dataset, and pre-trained models publicly available.
2 Overfitting in GANs
We start by studying how the quantity of available training data affects GAN training. We approach
this by artificially subsetting larger datasets (FFHQ and LSUN CAT) and observing the resulting
dynamics. For our baseline, we considered StyleGAN2 [20] and BigGAN [5, 36]. Based on initial
testing, we settled on StyleGAN2 because it provided more predictable results with significantly
lower variance between training runs (see Appendix A). For each run, we randomize the subset of
training data, order of training samples, and network initialization. To facilitate extensive sweeps
over dataset sizes and hyperparameters, we use a downscaled 256 × 256 version of FFHQ and a
lighter-weight configuration that reaches the same quality as the official StyleGAN2 config F for this
dataset, but runs 4.6× faster on NVIDIA DGX-1.1 We measure quality by computing FID between
50k generated images and all available real images, regardless of the subset used for training.
Figure 1a shows our baseline results for different subsets of FFHQ. Training starts the same way in
each case, but eventually the progress stops and FID starts to rise. The less training data there is, the
earlier this happens. Figure 1b,c shows the discriminator output distributions for real and generated
images during training. The distributions overlap initially but keep drifting apart as the discriminator
becomes more and more confident, and the point where FID starts to deteriorate is consistent with the
loss of sufficient overlap between distributions. This is a strong indication of overfitting, evidenced
further by the drop in accuracy measured for a separate validation set. We propose a way to tackle
this problem by employing versatile augmentations that prevent the discriminator from becoming
overly confident.
2.1 Stochastic discriminator augmentation
By definition, any augmentation that is applied to the training dataset will get inherited to the
generated images [13]. Zhao et al. [49] recently proposed balanced consistency regularization (bCR)
as a solution that is not supposed to leak augmentations to the generated images. Consistency
regularization states that two sets of augmentations, applied to the same input image, should yield the
same output [33, 25]. Zhao et al. add consistency regularization terms for the discriminator loss, and
enforce discriminator consistency for both real and generated images, whereas no augmentations or
consistency loss terms are applied when training the generator (Figure 2a). As such, their approach
effectively strives to generalize the discriminator by making it blind to the augmentations used in
1We use 2× fewer feature maps, 2× larger minibatch, mixed-precision training for layers at ≥ 322,
η = 0.0025, γ = 1, and exponential moving average half-life of 20k images for generator weights.
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Figure 2: (a,b) Flowcharts for balanced consistency regularization (bCR) [49] and our stochastic
discriminator augmentations (DA). The blue elements highlight operations related to augmentations,
while the rest implement standard GAN training with generator G and discriminator D [13]. We
use the non-saturating logistic loss [13] f(x) = log (sigmoid(x)). (c) We apply a diverse set of
augmentations to every image that the discriminator sees, controlled by an augmentation probability p.
the CR term. However, meeting this goal opens the door for leaking augmentations, because the
generator will be free to produce images containing them without any penalty. In Section 4, we show
experimentally that bCR indeed suffers from this problem, and thus its effects are fundamentally
similar to dataset augmentation.
Our solution is similar to bCR in that we also apply a set of augmentations to all images shown to the
discriminator. However, instead of adding separate CR loss terms, we evaluate the discriminator only
using augmented images, and do this also when training the generator (Figure 2b). This approach
that we call discriminator augmentation (DA) is therefore very straightforward. Yet, this possibility
has received little attention, possibly because at first glance it is not obvious if it even works: if the
discriminator never sees what the training images really look like, it is not clear if it can guide the
generator properly (Figure 2c). We will therefore first investigate the conditions under which DA
will not leak an augmentation to the generated images, and then build a full pipeline out of such
transformations.
2.2 Designing augmentations that do not leak
Discriminator augmentation corresponds to putting distorting, perhaps even destructive goggles on
the discriminator, and asking the generator to produce samples that cannot be distinguished from the
training set when viewed through the goggles. Bora et al. [4] consider a similar problem in training
GANs under corrupted measurements, and show that the training implicitly undoes the corruptions
and finds the correct distribution, as long as the corruption process is represented by an invertible
transformation of probability distributions over the data space. We call such augmentation operators
non-leaking.
The power of these invertible transformations is that they allow conclusions about the equality or
inequality of the underlying sets to be drawn by observing only the augmented sets. It is crucial to
understand that this does not mean that augmentations performed on individual images would need to
be undoable. For instance, an augmentation as extreme as setting the input image to zero 90% of the
time is invertible in the probability distribution sense: it would be easy, even for a human, to reason
about the original distribution by ignoring black images until only 10% of the images remain. On the
other hand, random rotations chosen uniformly from {0◦, 90◦, 180◦, 270◦} are not invertible: it is
impossible to discern differences among the orientations after the augmentation.
The situation changes if this rotation is only executed at a probability p < 1: this increases the
relative occurrence of 0◦, and now the augmented distributions can match only if the generated
images have correct orientation. Similarly, many other stochastic augmentations can be designed to
be non-leaking on the condition that they are skipped with a non-zero probability. Appendix C shows
that this can be made to hold for a large class of widely used augmentations, including deterministic
mappings (e.g., basis transformations), additive noise, transformation groups (e.g, image or color
space rotations, flips and scaling), and projections (e.g., cutout [11]). Furthermore, composing
non-leaking augmentations in a fixed order yields an overall non-leaking augmentation.
In Figure 3 we validate our analysis by three practical examples. Isotropic scaling with log-normal
distribution is an example of an inherently safe augmentation that does not leak regardless of the
value of p (Figure 3a). However, the aforementioned rotation by a random multiple of 90◦ must be
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(c) Color transformations
Figure 3: Leaking behavior of three example augmentations, shown as FID w.r.t. the probability of
executing the augmentation. Each dot represents a complete training run, and the blue Gaussian
mixture is a visualization aid. The top row shows generated example images from selected training
runs, indicated by uppercase letters in the plots.
skipped at least part of the time (Figure 3b). When p is too high, the generator cannot know which
way the generated images should face and ends up picking one of the possibilities at random. As
could be expected, the problem does not occur exclusively in the limiting case of p = 1. In practice,
the training setup is poorly conditioned for nearby values as well due to finite sampling, finite
representational power of the networks, inductive bias, and training dynamics. When p remains below
∼0.85, the generated images are always oriented correctly. Between these regions, the generator
sometimes picks a wrong orientation initially, and then partially drifts towards the correct distribution.
The same observations hold for a sequence of continuous color augmentations (Figure 3c). This
experiment suggests that as long as p remains below 0.8, leaks are unlikely to happen in practice.
2.3 Our augmentation pipeline
We start from the assumption that a maximally diverse set of augmentations is beneficial, given the
success of RandAugment [9] in image classification tasks. We consider a pipeline of 18 transforma-
tions that are grouped into 6 categories: pixel blitting (x-flips, 90◦ rotations, integer translation), more
general geometric transformations, color transforms, image-space filtering, additive noise [39], and
cutout [11]. Details of the individual augmentations are given in Appendix B. Note that we execute
augmentations also when training the generator (Figure 2b), which requires the augmentations to be
differentiable. We achieve this by implementing them using standard differentiable primitives offered
by the deep learning framework.
During training, we process each image shown to the discriminator using a pre-defined set of
transformations in a fixed order. The strength of augmentations is controlled by the scalar p ∈ [0, 1],
so that each transformation is applied with probability p or skipped with probability 1− p. We
always use the same value of p for all transformations. The randomization is done separately for each
augmentation and for each image in a minibatch. Given that there are many augmentations in the
pipeline, even fairly small values of p make it very unlikely that the discriminator sees a clean image
(Figure 2c). Nonetheless, the generator is guided to produce only clean images as long as p remains
below the practical safety limit.
In Figure 4 we study the effectiveness of DA by performing exhaustive sweeps over p for different
augmentation categories and dataset sizes. We observe that DA can improve the results significantly in
many cases. However, the optimal augmentation strength depends heavily on the amount of training
data, and not all augmentation categories are equally useful in practice. With a 2k training set, the
vast majority of the benefit came from pixel blitting and geometric transforms. Color transforms were
modestly beneficial, while image-space filtering, noise, and cutout were not particularly useful. In
this case, the best results were obtained using strong augmentations. The curves also indicate some of
the augmentations becoming leaky when p→ 1. With a 10k training set, the higher values of p were
less helpful, and with 140k the situation was markedly different: all augmentations were harmful.
Based on these results, we choose to use only pixel blitting, geometric, and color transforms for the
rest of our tests. Figure 4d shows that while stronger augmentations reduce overfitting, they also slow
down the convergence.
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Figure 4: (a-c) Impact of p for different augmentation categories and dataset sizes. The dashed gray
line indicates baseline FID without augmentations. (d) Convergence curves for selected values of p
using geometric augmentations with 10k training images.
In practice, the sensitivity to dataset size mandates a costly grid search, and even so, relying on any
fixed p may not be the best choice. Next, we address these concerns by making the process adaptive.
3 Adaptive discriminator augmentation
Ideally, we would like to avoid manual tuning of the augmentation strength and instead control it
dynamically based on the degree of overfitting. Figure 1 suggests a few possible approaches for this.
The standard way of quantifying overfitting is to use a separate validation set and observe its behavior
relative to the training set. From the figure we see that when overfitting kicks in, the validation set
starts behaving increasingly like the generated images. This is a quantifiable effect, albeit with the
drawback of requiring a separate validation set when training data may already be in short supply.
We can also see that with the non-saturating loss [13] used by StyleGAN2, the discriminator outputs
for real and generated images diverge symmetrically around zero as the situation gets worse. This
divergence can be quantified without a separate validation set.
Let us denote the discriminator outputs by Dtrain, Dvalidation, and Dgenerated for the training set, vali-
dation set, and generated images, respectively, and their mean over N consecutive minibatches by
E[·]. In practice we use N = 4, which corresponds to 4× 64 = 256 images. We can now turn our
observations about Figure 1 into two plausible overfitting heuristics:
rv =
E[Dtrain]− E[Dvalidation]
E[Dtrain]− E[Dgenerated] rt = E[sign(Dtrain)] (1)
For both heuristics, r = 0 means no overfitting and r = 1 indicates complete overfitting, and our
goal is to adjust the augmentation probability p so that the chosen heuristic matches a suitable target
value. The first heuristic, rv, expresses the output for a validation set relative to the training set and
generated images. Since it assumes the existence of a separate validation set, we include it mainly
as a comparison method. The second heuristic, rt, estimates the portion of the training set that gets
positive discriminator outputs. We have found this to be far less sensitive to the chosen target value
and other hyperparameters than the obvious alternative of looking at E[Dtrain] directly.
We control the augmentation strength p as follows. We initialize p to zero and adjust its value
once every four minibatches based on the chosen overfitting heuristic. If the heuristic indicates too
much/little overfitting, we counter by incrementing/decrementing p by a fixed amount. We set the
adjustment size so that p can rise from 0 to 1 sufficiently quickly, e.g., in 500k images. After every
step we clamp p from below to 0. We call this variant adaptive discriminator augmentation (ADA).
In Figure 5a,b we measure how the target value affects the quality obtainable using these heuristics.
We observe that rv and rt are both effective in preventing overfitting, and that they both improve the
results over the best fixed p found using grid search. We choose to use the more realistic rt heuristic
in all subsequent tests, with 0.6 as the target value. Figure 5c shows the resulting p over time. With a
2k training set, augmentations were applied almost always towards the end. This exceeds the practical
safety limit after which some augmentations become leaky, indicating that the augmentations were
not powerful enough. Indeed, FID started deteriorating after p ≈ 0.5 in this extreme case. Figure 5d
shows the evolution of rt with adaptive vs fixed p, showing that a fixed p tends to be too strong in the
beginning and too weak towards the end.
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Figure 5: Behavior of our adaptive augmentation strength heuristics in FFHQ. (a,b) FID for different
training set sizes as a function of the target value for rv and rt. The dashed horizontal lines indicate
the best fixed augmentation probability p found using grid search, and the dashed vertical line marks
the target value we will use in subsequent tests. (c) Evolution of p over the course of training using
heuristic rt. (d) Evolution of rt values over training. Dashes correspond to the fixed p values in (b).
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Figure 6: (a) Training curves for FFHQ with different training set sizes using adaptive augmentation.
(b) The supports of real and generated images continue to overlap. (c) Example magnitudes of the
gradients the generator receives from the discriminator as the training progresses.
Figure 6 repeats the setup from Figure 1 using ADA. Convergence is now achieved regardless of the
training set size and overfitting no longer occurs. Without augmentations, the gradients the generator
receives from the discriminator become very simplistic over time — the discriminator starts to pay
attention to only a handful of features, and the generator is free to create otherwise non-sensical
images. With ADA, the gradient field stays much more detailed which prevents such deterioration.
4 Evaluation
We start by testing our method against a number of alternatives in FFHQ and LSUN CAT, first in
a setting where a GAN is trained from scratch, then by applying transfer learning on a pre-trained
GAN. We conclude with results for several smaller datasets.
4.1 Training from scratch
Figure 7 shows our results in FFHQ and LSUN CAT across training set sizes, demonstrating that our
adaptive discriminator augmentation (ADA) improves FIDs substantially in limited data scenarios.
We also show results for balanced consistency regularization (bCR) [49], which has not been studied
in the context of limited data before. We find that bCR can be highly effective when the lack of data
is not too severe, but also that its set of augmentations leaks to the generated images. In this example,
we used only xy-translations by integer offsets for bCR, and Figure 7d shows that the generated
images get jittered as a result. This means that bCR is essentially a dataset augmentation and needs
to be limited to symmetries that actually benefit the training data, e.g., x-flip is often acceptable but
y-flip only rarely. Meanwhile, with ADA the augmentations do not leak, and thus the same diverse set
of augmentations can be safely used in all datasets. We also find that the benefits for ADA and bCR
are largely additive. We combine ADA and bCR so that ADA is first applied to the input image (real
or generated), and bCR then creates another version of this image using its own set of augmentations.
Qualitative results are shown in Appendix A.
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Figure 7: (a-c) FID as a function of training set size, reported as median/min/max over 3 training runs.
(d) Average of 10k random images generated using the networks trained with 5k subset of FFHQ.
ADA matches the average of real data, whereas the xy-translation augmentation in bCR [49] has
leaked to the generated images, significantly blurring the average image.
FFHQ (256× 256) 2k 10k 140k
Baseline 78.58 30.74 3.71
PA-GAN [45] 54.00 28.81 3.81
WGAN-GP [14] 78.12 35.26 6.47
zCR [49] 66.39 23.08 3.52
Aux. rotation [6] 67.57 25.20 4.16
Spectral norm [29] 89.83 38.21 4.59
Shallow mapping 72.00 26.64 3.60
Adaptive dropout 65.98 23.43 4.18
ADA (Ours) 16.71 8.13 3.81
Dataset
Scratch Transfer
FID KID FID KID
×103 ×103
METFACES 57.26 35.66 19.47 3.16
+ Freeze-D – – 17.06 2.05
ADA (Ours) 18.22 2.41 15.34 0.81
BRECAHAD 97.72 89.76 30.58 18.07
+ Freeze-D – – 19.38 6.94
ADA (Ours) 15.71 2.88 16.33 3.36
AFHQ DOG 19.37 9.62 11.64 4.63
+ Freeze-D – – 9.02 2.80
ADA (Ours) 7.40 1.16 7.65 1.40
Method Uncond. Cond.FID ↓ IS ↑ FID ↓ IS ↑
ProGAN [18] 15.52 8.56 – –
AutoGAN [12] 12.42 8.55 – –
BigGAN [5] – – 14.73 9.22
+ Tuning [21] – – 8.47 9.07
MultiHinge [21] – – 6.40 9.58
FQ-GAN [48] – – 5.59 8.48
Baseline 9.90 8.99 9.37 9.16
+ ADA (Ours) 4.65 9.92 3.31 10.14
+ Tuning 3.26 9.74 2.67 10.06
(a) Comparison methods (b) Results for other datasets (c) CIFAR-10
Figure 8: (a) Comparison methods; median of 3 runs. (b) Other datasets trained with StyleGAN2
config F, StyleGAN2 + Freeze-D, and ADA. We report the best KID, and compute FID using the same
snapshot. (c) CIFAR-10 results reported as averages of the best scores over 5 training runs. For the
comparison methods we report the average scores when available, and the single best score otherwise.
The best IS and FID were searched separately [21], and often came from different snapshots.
In Figure 8a we further compare our adaptive augmentation against a wider set of alternatives:
PA-GAN [45], WGAN-GP [14], zCR [49], auxiliary rotations [6], and spectral normalization [29].
We also try modifying our baseline to use a shallower mapping network, which can be trained with
less data, borrowing intuition from DeLiGAN [15]. Finally, we try replacing our augmentations with
multiplicative dropout [40], whose per-layer strength is driven by our adaptation algorithm. We spent
considerable effort tuning the parameters of all these methods, see Appendix D. We can see that ADA
gave significantly better results than the alternatives. While PA-GAN is somewhat similar to our
method, its checksum task was not strong enough to prevent overfitting in our tests.
4.2 Transfer learning
Transfer learning reduces the training data requirements by starting from a model trained using
some other dataset, instead of a random initialization. Several authors have explored this in the
context of GANs [41, 42, 32], and Mo et al. [31] recently showed strong results by freezing the
highest-resolution layers of the discriminator during transfer (Freeze-D).
We explore several transfer learning setups in Figure 9, using the best Freeze-D configuration found
for each case with grid search. Transfer learning gives significantly better results than from-scratch
training, and its success seems to depend primarily on the diversity of the source dataset, instead of
the similarity between subjects. For example, FFHQ (human faces) can be trained equally well from
CELEBA-HQ (human faces, low diversity) or LSUN DOG (more diverse). LSUN CAT, however,
can only be trained from LSUN DOG, which has comparable diversity, but not from the less diverse
datasets. With small target dataset sizes, our baseline achieves reasonable FID quickly, but the
progress soon reverts as training continues. ADA is again able to prevent the divergence almost
completely. Freeze-D provides a small but reliable improvement when used together with ADA but is
not able to prevent the divergence on its own.
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(a) Without ADA (b) With ADA (c) Dataset sizes (d) Datasets
Figure 9: Transfer learning FFHQ starting from a pre-trained CELEBA-HQ model, both 256× 256.
(a) Training convergence for our baseline method and Freeze-D [31]. (b) The same configurations
with ADA. (c) FIDs as a function of dataset size. (d) Effect of source and target datasets.
Generated images for METFACES (new dataset) BRECAHAD AFHQ DOG CIFAR-10
1336 images at 10242 resolution, transfer learning using ADA 1944 img, 5122 4739 img, 5122 50k, 10 cls, 322
Figure 10: Example generated images for several datasets with limited amount of training data, trained
using ADA. We use transfer learning with METFACES and train other datasets from scratch. See
Appendix A for uncurated results and real images, and Appendix D for our training configurations.
4.3 Small datasets
We tried our method with several datasets that consist of a limited number of training images
(Figure 10). METFACES is our new dataset of 1336 high-quality faces extracted from the collection of
Metropolitan Museum of Art (https://metmuseum.github.io/). BRECAHAD [1] consists of only
162 breast cancer histopathology images (1360 × 1024); we reorganized these into 1944 partially
overlapping crops of 5122. Animal faces dog category (AFHQ DOG) [7] includes ∼5k closeups of
various dog breeds. CIFAR-10 includes 50k tiny images in 10 categories [23].
Figure 8b reveals that FID is not an ideal metric for small datasets, because it becomes dominated
by the inherent bias when the number of real images is insufficient. We find that kernel inception
distance (KID) [3] — that is unbiased by design — is more descriptive in practice and see that ADA
provides a dramatic improvement over baseline StyleGAN2 in all cases. In the widely used CIFAR-10
benchmark, we improve the SOTA FID from 5.59 to 2.92 and inception score (IS) [35] from 9.58 to
10.21 in the class-conditional setting (Figure 8c). This large improvement portrays CIFAR-10 as a
limited data benchmark. We also note that CIFAR-specific architecture tuning had a significant effect.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that our adaptive discriminator augmentation reliably stabilizes training and vastly
improves the result quality when training data is in short supply. Of course, augmentation is not a
substitute for real data — one should always try to collect a large, high-quality set of training data
first, and only then fill the gaps using augmentation. As future work, it would be worthwhile to search
for the most effective set of augmentations, and to see if recently published techniques, such as the
U-net discriminator [36] or multi-modal generator [37], could also help with limited data.
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Broader impact
Data-driven generative modeling means learning a computational recipe for generating complicated
data based purely on examples. This is a foundational problem in machine learning. In addition
to their fundamental nature, generative models have several uses within applied machine learning
research as priors, regularizers, and so on. In those roles, they advance the capabilities of computer
vision and graphics algorithms for analyzing and synthesizing realistic imagery.
The methods presented in this work enable high-quality generative image models to be trained using
significantly less data than required by existing approaches. It thereby primarily contributes to the
deep technical question of how much data is enough for generative models to succeed in picking up
the necessary commonalities and relationships in the data.
From an applied point of view, this work contributes to efficiency; it does not introduce fundamental
new capabilities. Therefore, it seems likely that the advances here will not substantially affect the
overall themes — surveillance, authenticity, privacy, etc. — in the active discussion on the broader
impacts of computer vision and graphics.
Specifically, generative models’ implications on image and video authenticity is a topic of active
discussion. Most attention revolves around conditional models that allow semantic control and
sometimes manipulation of existing images. Our algorithm does not offer direct controls for high-
level attributes (e.g., identity, pose, expression of people) in the generated images, nor does it enable
direct modification of existing images. However, over time and through the work of other researchers,
our advances will likely lead to improvements in these types of models as well.
The contributions in this work make it easier to train high-quality generative models with custom sets
of images. By this, we eliminate, or at least significantly lower, the barrier for applying GAN-type
models in many applied fields of research. We hope and believe that this will accelerate progress in
several such fields. For instance, modeling the space of possible appearance of biological specimens
(tissues, tumors, etc.) is a growing field of research that appears to chronically suffer from limited
high-quality data. Overall, generative models hold promise for increased understanding of the
complex and hard-to-pinpoint relationships in many real-world phenomena; our work hopefully
increases the breadth of phenomena that can be studied.
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Appendices
A Additional results
In Figures 11, 12, and 13, we show generated images for METFACES, AFHQ DOG, and BRECAHAD,
respectively, along with real images from the respective training sets (Section 4.3 and Figure 8b).
The images were selected at random; we did not perform any cherry-picking besides choosing one
global random seed. We can see that ADA yields excellent results in all cases, and with slight
truncation [27, 19], virtually all of the images look convincing. Without ADA, the convergence is
hampered by discriminator overfitting, leading to inferior image quality for the original StyleGAN2.
Figure 14 presents extended result tables for the comparison methods (Figure 8a) and CIFAR-10
(Figure 8c) with error bounds computed over multiple independent training runs. Figure 15 shows
examples of the generated CIFAR-10 images in both unconditional and class-conditional setting (See
Appendix D.1 for details on the conditional setup). Figure 16 shows qualitative results for different
methods using subsets of FFHQ at 256×256 resolution. Methods that do not employ augmentation
(BigGAN, StyleGAN2, and our baseline) degrade noticeably as the size of the training set decreases,
generally yielding poor image quality and diversity with fewer than 30k training images. With ADA,
the degradation is much more graceful, and the results remain reasonable even with a 5k training set.
Figure 17 compares our results with unconditional BigGAN [5, 36] and StyleGAN2 config F [20].
BigGAN was very unstable in our experiments: while some of the results were quite good, ap-
proximately 50% of the training runs failed to converge. StyleGAN2, on the other hand, behaved
predictably, with different training runs resulting in nearly identical FID. We note that FID has a
general tendency to increase as the training set gets smaller — not only because of the lower image
quality, but also due to inherent bias in FID itself [3]. In our experiments, we minimize the impact
of this bias by always computing FID between 50k generated images and all available real images,
regardless of which subset was used for training. To estimate the magnitude of bias in FID, we
simulate a hypothetical generator that replicates the training set as-is, and compute the average FID
over 100 random trials with different subsets of training data; the standard deviation was ≤2% in all
cases. We can see that the bias remains negligible with ≥20k training images but starts to dominate
with ≤2k. Interestingly, ADA reaches the same FID as the best-case generator with FFHQ-1k,
indicating that FID is no longer able to differentiate between the two in this case.
Figure 18 shows additional examples of bCR leaking to generated images and compares bCR with
dataset augmentation. In particular, rotations in range [−45◦,+45◦] (denoted ±45◦) serve as a very
clear example that attempting to make the discriminator blind to certain transformations opens up the
possibility for the generator to produce similarly transformed images with no penalty. In applications
where such leaks are acceptable, one can employ either bCR or dataset augmentation — we find that
it is difficult to predict which method is better. For example, with translation augmentations bCR
was significantly better than dataset augmentation, whereas x-flip was much more effective when
implemented as a dataset augmentation.
Finally, Figure 19 shows an extended version of Figure 4, illustrating the effect of different augmenta-
tion categories with increasing augmentation probability p. Blit + Geom + Color yielded the best
results with a 2k training set and remained competitive with larger training sets as well.
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ADA (Ours), truncated (ψ = 0.7) Real images from the training set
ADA (Ours), untruncated Original StyleGAN2 config F, untruncated
FID 15.34 – KID 0.81×103 – Recall 0.261 FID 19.47 – KID 3.16×103 – Recall 0.350
Figure 11: Uncurated 1024×1024 results generated for METFACES (1336 images) with and without
ADA, along with real images from the training set. Both generators were trained using transfer
learning, starting from the pre-trained StyleGAN2 for FFHQ. We recommend zooming in.
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ADA (Ours), truncated (ψ = 0.7) Real images from the training set
ADA (Ours), untruncated Original StyleGAN2 config F, untruncated
FID 7.40 – KID 1.16×103 – Recall 0.454 FID 19.37 – KID 9.62×103 – Recall 0.196
Figure 12: Uncurated 512×512 results generated for AFHQ DOG [7] (4739 images) with and without
ADA, along with real images from the training set. Both generators were trained from scratch. We
recommend zooming in to inspect the image quality in detail.
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ADA (Ours), truncated (ψ = 0.7) Real images from the training set
ADA (Ours), untruncated Original StyleGAN2 config F, untruncated
FID 15.71 – KID 2.88×103 – Recall 0.340 FID 97.72 – KID 89.76×103 – Recall 0.027
Figure 13: Uncurated 512×512 results generated for BRECAHAD [1] (1944 images) with and
without ADA, along with real images from the training set. Both generators were trained from scratch.
We recommend zooming in to inspect the image quality in detail.
FFHQ (256× 256) 2k 10k 140k
Baseline 78.80±2.31 30.73±0.48 3.66±0.10
PA-GAN [45] 56.49±7.28 27.71±2.77 3.78±0.06
WGAN-GP [14] 79.19±6.30 35.68±1.27 6.54±0.37
zCR [49] 71.61±9.64 23.02±2.09 3.45±0.19
Aux. rotation [6] 66.64±3.64 25.37±1.45 4.16±0.05
Spectral norm [29] 88.71±3.18 38.58±3.14 4.60±0.19
Shallow mapping 71.35±7.20 27.71±1.96 3.59±0.22
Adaptive dropout 67.23±4.76 23.33±0.98 4.16±0.05
ADA (Ours) 16.49±0.65 8.29±0.31 3.88±0.13
Method Unconditional ConditionalFID ↓ IS ↑ FID ↓ IS ↑
ProGAN [18] 15.52 8.56±0.06 – –
AutoGAN [12] 12.42 8.55±0.10 – –
BigGAN [5] – – 14.73 9.22
+ Tuning [21] – – 8.47 9.07±0.13
MultiHinge [21] – – 6.40 9.58±0.09
FQ-GAN [48] – – 5.59±0.12 8.48
Baseline 9.90±0.19 8.99±0.10 9.37±0.26 9.16±0.05
+ ADA (Ours) 4.65±0.32 9.92±0.08 3.31±0.10 10.14±0.06
+ Tuning 3.26±0.08 9.74±0.05 2.67±0.05 10.06±0.03
(a) Comparison methods (3 training runs) (b) CIFAR-10 (5 training runs)
Figure 14: Extended results for comparison methods (Figure 8a) and CIFAR-10 (Figure 8c). We
report the mean and standard deviation for each case, calculated over multiple independent training
runs. For CIFAR-10, we quote the previous results from their respective papers as-is. We computed
the FID for Progressive GAN [18] using the publicly available pre-trained network.
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Figure 15: Generated and real images for CIFAR-10 in the unconditional setting (top) and each
class in the conditional setting (bottom). We show the results for the best generators trained in the
context of Figures 8c and 14b, selected according to either FID or IS. The numbers refer to the single
best model and are therefore slightly better than the averages quoted in the result tables. It is clearly
visible that the model with the highest IS produces crisper, perceptually higher quality results than
the model with the lowest FID, especially in the animal categories. This is in line with the common
approximation (e.g., [5]) that IS roughly corresponds to Precision and FID to Recall, two independent
aspects of result quality [34, 24].
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Figure 16: Images generated for different subsets of FFHQ at 256×256 resolution using the training
setups from Figures 7 and 17. We show the best snapshot of the best training run for each case,
selected according to FID, so the numbers are slightly better than the medians reported in Figure 7c. In
addition to FID, we also report the Recall metric [24] as a more direct way to estimate image diversity.
The bolded numbers indicate the lowest FID and highest Recall for each training set size. “BigGAN”
corresponds to the unconditional variant of BigGAN [5] proposed by Schönfeld et al. [36], and
“StyleGAN2” corresponds to config F of the official TensorFlow implementation by Karras et al. [20].
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(a) Different subsets of FFHQ at 256×256 (b) Different subsets of LSUN CAT at 256×256
Figure 17: Comparison of our results with unconditional BigGAN [5, 36] and StyleGAN2 con-
fig F [20]. We report the median/min/max FID as a function of training set size, calculated over
multiple independent training runs. The dashed red line illustrates the expected bias of the FID metric,
computed using a hypothetical generator that outputs random images from the training set as-is.
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Figure 18: (a) Examples of bCR leaking to generated images. (b) Comparison between dataset
augmentation and bCR using ±8px translations and x-flips. (c) In general, dataset x-flips can provide
a significant boost to FID in cases where they are appropriate. For baseline, the effect is almost equal
to doubling the size of training set, as evidenced by the consistent 2× horizontal offset between the
blue curves. With ADA the effect is somewhat weaker.
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Figure 19: Extended version of Figure 4, illustrating the individual and cumulative effect of different
augmentation categories with increasing augmentation probability p.
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B Our augmentation pipeline
We designed our augmentation pipeline based on three goals. First, the entire pipeline must be strictly
non-leaking (Appendix C). Second, we aim for a maximally diverse set of augmentations, inspired by
the success of RandAugment [9]. Third, we strive for the highest possible image quality to reduce
unintended artifacts such as aliasing. In total, our pipeline consists of 18 transformations: geometric
(7), color (5), filtering (4), and corruption (2). We implement it entirely on the GPU in a differentiable
fashion, with full support for batching. All parameters are sampled independently for each image.
B.1 Geometric and color transformations
Figure 20 shows pseudocode for our geometric and color transformations, along with example images.
In general, geometric transformations tend to lose high-frequency details of the input image due to
uneven resampling, which may reduce the capability of the discriminator to detect pixel-level errors
in the generated images. We alleviate this by introducing a dedicated sub-category, pixel blitting,
that only copies existing pixels as-is, without blending between neighboring pixels. Furthermore,
we avoid gradual image degradation from multiple consecutive transformations by collapsing all
geometric transformations into a single combined operation.
The parameters for pixel blitting are selected on lines 5–15, consisting of x-flips (line 7), 90◦ rotations
(line 10), and integer translations (line 13). The transformations are accumulated into a homogeneous
3× 3 matrix G, defined so that input pixel (xi, yi) is placed at [xo, yo, 1]T = G · [xi, yi, 1]T in the
output. The origin is located at the center of the image and neighboring pixels are spaced at unit
intervals. We apply each transformation with probability p by sampling its parameters from uniform
distribution, either discrete U{·} or continuous U(·), and updating G using elementary transforms:
SCALE2D(sx, sy) =
[
sx 0 0
0 sy 0
0 0 1
]
, ROTATE2D(θ) =
[
cos θ − sin θ 0
sin θ cos θ 0
0 0 1
]
, TRANSLATE2D(tx, ty) =
[
1 0 tx
0 1 ty
0 0 1
]
(2)
General geometric transformations are handled in a similar way on lines 16–32, consisting of isotropic
scaling (line 17), arbitrary rotation (lines 21 and 27), anisotropic scaling (line 24), and fractional
translation (line 30). Since both of the scaling transformations are multiplicative in nature, we sample
their parameter, s, from a log-normal distribution so that ln s ∼ N (0, (0.2 · ln 2)2). In practice, this
can be done by first sampling t ∼ N (0, 1) and then calculating s = exp2(0.2t). We allow anisotropic
scaling to operate in other directions besides the coordinate axes by breaking the rotation into two
independent parts, one applied before the scaling (line 21) and one after it (line 27). We apply the
rotations slightly less frequently than other transformations, so that the probability of applying at
least one rotation is equal to p. Note that we also have two translations in our pipeline (lines 13 and
30), one applied at the beginning and one at the end. To increase the diversity of our augmentations,
we use U(·) for the former and N (·) for the latter.
Once the parameters are settled, the combined geometric transformation is executed on lines 33–47.
We avoid undesirable effects at image borders by first padding the image with reflection. The amount
of padding is calculated dynamically based on G so that none of the output pixels are affected by
regions outside the image (line 35). We then upsample the image to a higher resolution (line 40) and
transform it using bilinear interpolation (line 45). Operating at a higher resolution is necessary to
reduce aliasing when the image is minified, e.g., as a result of isotropic scaling — interpolating at
the original resolution would fail to correctly filter out frequencies above Nyquist in this case, no
matter which interpolation filter was used. The choice of the upsampling filter requires some care,
however, because we must ensure that an identity transform does not modify the image in any way
(e.g., when p = 0). In other words, we need to use a lowpass filter H(z) with cutoff fc = pi2 that
satisfies DOWNSAMPLE2D
(
UPSAMPLE2D
(
Y,H(z−1)
)
, H(z)
)
= Y . Luckily, existing literature
on wavelets [10] offers a wide selection of such filters; we choose 12-tap symlets (SYM6) to strike a
balance between resampling quality and computational cost.
Finally, color transformations are applied to the resulting image on lines 48–70. The overall oper-
ation is similar to geometric transformations: we collect the parameters of each individual trans-
formation into a homogeneous 4 × 4 matrix C that we then apply to each pixel by computing
[ro, go, bo, 1]
T = C · [ri, gi, bi, 1]T . The transformations include adjusting brightness (line 50), con-
trast (line 53), and saturation (line 63), as well as flipping the luma axis while keeping the chroma
unchanged (line 57) and rotating the hue axis by an arbitrary amount (line 60).
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1: input: original imageX , augmentation probability p
2: output: augmented image Y
3: (w, h)← SIZE(X)
4: Y ← CONVERT(X, FLOAT) . Yx,y ∈ [−1,+1]3
5: . Select parameters for pixel blitting
6: G← I3 . Homogeneous 2D transformation matrix
7: apply x-flip with probability p
8: sample i ∼ U{0, 1}
9: G← SCALE2D(1− 2i, 1) ·G
10: apply 90◦ rotations with probability p
11: sample i ∼ U{0, 3}
12: G← ROTATE2D(− pi2 · i) ·G
13: apply integer translation with probability p
14: sample tx, ty ∼ U(−0.125,+0.125)
15: G← TRANSLATE2D(round(txw), round(tyh)) ·G
16: . Select parameters for general geometric transformations
17: apply isotropic scaling with probability p
18: sample s ∼ Lognormal(0, (0.2 · ln 2)2)
19: G← SCALE2D(s, s) ·G
20: prot ← 1−
√
1− p . P (pre ∪ post) = p
21: apply pre-rotation with probability prot
22: sample θ ∼ U(−pi,+pi)
23: G← ROTATE2D(−θ) ·G . Before anisotropic scaling
24: apply anisotropic scaling with probability p
25: sample s ∼ Lognormal(0, (0.2 · ln 2)2)
26: G← SCALE2D(s, 1s ) ·G
27: apply post-rotation with probability prot
28: sample θ ∼ U(−pi,+pi)
29: G← ROTATE2D(−θ) ·G . After anisotropic scaling
30: apply fractional translation with probability p
31: sample tx, ty ∼ N
(
0, (0.125)2
)
32: G← TRANSLATE2D(txw, tyh) ·G
33: . Pad image and adjust origin
34: H(z)← WAVELET(SYM6) . Orthogonal lowpass filter
35: (mlo ,mhi )← CALCULATEPADDING
(
G,w, h,H(z)
)
36: Y ← PAD(Y,mlo ,mhi , REFLECT)
37: T ← TRANSLATE2D( 12 (w +mlo,x), 12 (h+mlo,y))
38: G← T ·G · T−1 . Place origin at image center
39: . Execute geometric transformations
40: Y ′ ← UPSAMPLE2X2(Y,H(z−1))
41: S ← SCALE2D(2, 2)
42: G← S ·G · S−1 . Account for the upsampling
43: for each pixel (xo, yo) ∈ Y ′ do
44: [xi, yi, zi]T ← G−1 · [xo, yo, 1]T
45: Yxo,yo ← BILINEARLOOKUP(Y ′, xi, yi)
46: Y ← DOWNSAMPLE2X2(Y,H(z))
47: Y ← CROP(Y,mlo ,mhi ) . Undo the padding
48: . Select parameters for color transformations
49: C ← I4 . Homogeneous 3D transformation matrix
50: apply brightness with probability p
51: sample b ∼ N(0, (0.2)2)
52: C ← TRANSLATE3D(b, b, b) · C
53: apply contrast with probability p
54: sample c ∼ Lognormal(0, (0.5 · ln 2)2)
55: C ← SCALE3D(c, c, c) · C
56: v ← [1, 1, 1, 0]/√3 . Luma axis
57: apply luma flip with probability p
58: sample i ∼ U{0, 1}
59: C ← (I4 − 2vT v · i) · C . Householder reflection
60: apply hue rotation with probability p
61: sample θ ∼ U(−pi,+pi)
62: C ← ROTATE3D(v, θ) · C . Rotate around v
63: apply saturation with probability p
64: sample s ∼ Lognormal(0, (1 · ln 2)2)
65: C ←
(
vT v +
(
I4 − vT v
) · s) · C
66: . Execute color transformations
67: for each pixel (x, y) ∈ Y do
68: (ri, gi, bi)← Yx,y
69: [ro, go, bo, ao]T ← C · [ri, gi, bi, 1]T
70: Yx,y ← (ro, go, bo)
71: return Y
Percentile: 5th 35th 65th 95th
Pixel blitting
x-flip
90◦
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Integer
translation
General geometric transformations
Isotropic
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Figure 20: Pseudocode and example images for geometric and color transformations (Appendix B.1).
We illustrate the effect of each individual transformation (apply) using four sets of parameter values,
representing the 5th, 35th, 65th, and 95th percentiles of their corresponding distributions (sample).
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1: input: original imageX , augmentation probability p
2: output: augmented image Y
3: (w, h)← SIZE(X)
4: Y ← CONVERT(X, FLOAT) . Yx,y ∈ [−1,+1]3
5: . Select parameters for image-space filtering
6: b←
[[
0, pi8
]
,
[
pi
8 ,
pi
4
]
,
[
pi
4 ,
pi
2
]
,
[
pi
2 , pi
]]
. Freq. bands
7: g ← [1, 1, 1, 1] . Global gain vector (identity)
8: λ← [10, 1, 1, 1]/13 . Expected power spectrum (1/f)
9: for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 do
10: apply amplification for bi with probability p
11: t← [1, 1, 1, 1] . Temporary gain vector
12: sample ti ∼ Lognormal
(
0, (1 · ln 2)2)
13: t← t/√∑j λjt2j . Normalize power
14: g ← g  t . Accumulate into global gain
15: . Execute image-space filtering
16: H(z)← WAVELET(SYM2) . Orthogonal 4-tap filter bank
17: H′(z)← 0 . Combined amplification filter
18: for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 do
19: H′(z)← H′(z) + BANDPASS(H(z), bi) · gi
20: (mlo ,mhi )← CALCULATEPADDING
(
H′(z)
)
21: Y ← PAD(Y,mlo ,mhi , REFLECT)
22: Y ← SEPARABLECONV2D(Y,H′(z))
23: Y ← CROP(Y,mlo ,mhi )
24: . Additive RGB noise
25: apply noise with probability p
26: sample σ ∼ Halfnormal((0.1)2)
27: for each pixel (x, y) ∈ Y do
28: sample nr, ng, nb ∼ N (0, σ2)
29: Yx,y ← Yx,y + [nr, ng, nb]
30: . Cutout
31: apply cutout with probability p
32: sample cx, cy ∼ U(0, 1)
33: rlo ← round
([(
cx − 14
) · w, (cy − 14 ) · h])
34: rhi ← round
([(
cx +
1
4
) · w, (cy + 14 ) · h])
35: Y ← Y  (1− RECTANGULARMASK(rlo , rhi ))
36: return Y
Percentile: 5th 35th 65th 95th
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Figure 21: Pseudocode and example images for image-space filtering and corruptions (Appendix B.2).
x y denotes element-wise multiplication.
B.2 Image-space filtering and corruptions
Figure 21 shows pseudocode for our image-space filtering and corruptions. The parameters for image-
space filtering are selected on lines 5–14. The idea is to divide the frequency content of the image into
4 non-overlapping bands and amplify/weaken each band in turn via a sequence of 4 transformations,
so that each transformation is applied independently with probability p (lines 9–10). Frequency
bands b2, b3, and b4 correspond to the three highest octaves, respectively, while the remaining low
frequencies are attributed to b1 (line 6). We track the overall gain of each band using vector g (line 7)
that we update after each transformation (line 14). We sample the amplification factor for a given
band from log-normal distribution (line 12), similar to geometric scaling, and normalize the overall
gain so that the total energy is retained on expectation. For the normalization, we assume that the
frequency content obeys 1/f power spectrum typically seen in natural images (line 8). While this
assumption is not strictly true in our case, especially when some of the previous frequency bands
have already been amplified, it is sufficient to keep the output pixel values within reasonable bounds.
The filtering is executed on lines 15–23. We first construct a combined amplification filter H ′(z)
(lines 17–19) and then perform separable convolution for the image using reflection padding (lines 21–
23). We use a zero-phase filter bank derived from 4-tap symlets (SYM2) [10]. Denoting the wavelet
scaling filter by H(z), the corresponding bandpass filters are obtained as follows (line 19):
BANDPASS
(
H(z), b1
)
=
(
H(z)H(z−1)
) · (H(z2)H(z−2)) · (H(z4)H(z−4)) (3)
BANDPASS
(
H(z), b2
)
=
(
H(z)H(z−1)
) · (H(z2)H(z−2)) · (H(−z4)H(−z−4)) (4)
BANDPASS
(
H(z), b3
)
=
(
H(z)H(z−1)
) · (H(−z2)H(−z−2)) (5)
BANDPASS
(
H(z), b4
)
= H(−z)H(−z−1) (6)
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Finally, we apply additive RGB noise on lines 24–29 and cutout on lines 30–35. We vary the
strength of the noise by sampling its standard deviation from half-normal distribution, i.e., N (·)
restricted to non-negative values (line 26). For cutout, we match the original implementation of
DeVries and Taylor [11] by setting pixels to zero within a rectangular area of size
(
w
2 ,
h
2
)
, with the
center point selected from uniform distribution over the entire image.
C Non-leaking augmentations
The goal of GAN training is to find a generator function G whose output probability distribution x
(under suitable stochastic input) matches a given target distribution y.
When augmenting both the dataset and the generator output, the key safety principle is that if x and
y do not match, then their augmented versions must not match either. If the augmentation pipeline
violates this principle, the generator is free to learn some different output distribution than the dataset,
as these look identical after the augmentations – we say that the augmentations leak. Conversely, if
the principle holds, then the only option for the generator is to learn the correct distribution: no other
choice results in a post-augmentation match.
In this section, we study the conditions on the augmentation pipeline under which this holds and
demonstrate the safety and caveats of various common augmentations and their compositions.
Notation Throughout this section, we denote probability distributions (and their generalizations)
with lowercase bold-face letters (e.g., x), operators acting on them by calligraphic letters (T ), and
variates sampled from probability distributions by upper-case letters (X).
C.1 Augmentation operator
A very general model for augmentations is as follows. Assume a fixed but arbitrarily complicated non-
linear and stochastic augmentation pipeline. To any image X , it assigns a distribution of augmented
images, such as demonstrated in Figure 2c. This idea is captured by an augmentation operator T
that maps probability distributions to probability distributions (or, informally, datasets to augmented
datasets). A distribution with the lone image X is the Dirac point mass δX , which is mapped to some
distribution T δX of augmented images.2 In general, applying T to an arbitrary distribution x yields
the linear superposition T x of such augmented distributions.
It is important to understand that T is different from a function f(X;φ) that actually applies the
augmentation on any individual imageX sampled from x (parametrized by some φ, e.g., angle in case
of a rotation augmentation). It captures the aggregate effect of applying this function on all images
in the distribution and subsumes the randomization of the function parameters. T is always linear
and deterministic, regardless of non-linearity of the function f and stochasticity of its parameters
φ. We will later discuss invertibility of T . Here it is also critical to note that its invertibility is not
equivalent with the invertibility of the function f it is based on; for an example, refer to the discussion
in Section 2.2.
Specifically, T is a (Markov) transition operator. Intuitively, it is an (uncountably) infinite-
dimensional generalization of a Markov transition matrix (i.e. a stochastic matrix), with nonnegative
entries that sum to 1 along columns. In this analogy, probability distributions upon which T operates
are vectors, with nonnegative entries summing to 1. More generally, the distributions have a vector
space structure and they can be arbitrarily linearly combined (in which case they may lose their
validity as probability distributions and are viewed as arbitrary signed measures). Similarly, we can
do algebra with the with the operators by linearly combining and composing them like matrices.
Concepts such as null space and invertibility carry over to this setting, with suitable technical care. In
the following, we will be somewhat informal with the measure theoretical and functional analytic
details of the problem, and draw upon this analogy as appropriate.3
2These distributions are probability measures over a non-discrete high dimensional space: for example, in
our experiments with 256× 256 RGB images, this space is R256∗256∗3 = R196608.
3The addition and scalar multiplication of measures is taken to mean that for any set S to which x and y
assign a measure, [αx+ βy](S) = αx(S) + βy(S). When the measures are represented by density functions,
this simplifies to the usual pointwise linear combination of the functions. We always mean addition and scalar
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C.2 Invertibility implies non-leaking augmentations
Within this framework, our question can be stated as follows. Given a target distribution y and an
augmentation operator T , we train for a generated distribution x such that the augmented distributions
match, namely
T x = T y. (7)
The desired outcome is that this equation is satisfied only by the correct target distribution, namely
x = y. We say that T leaks if there exist distributions x 6= y that satisfy the above equation, and the
goal is to find conditions that guarantee the absence of leaks.
There are obviously no such leaks in classical non-augmented training, where T is the identity I,
whence T x = T y⇒ Ix = Iy⇒ x = y. For arbitrary augmentations, the desired outcome x = y
does always satisfy Eq. 7; however, if also other choices of x satisfy it, then it cannot be guaranteed
that the training lands on the desired solution. A trivial example is an augmentation that maps every
image to black (in other words, T z = δ0 for any z). Then, T x = T y does not imply that x = y, as
indeed any choice of x produces the same set of black images that satisfies Eq. 7. In this case, it is
vanishingly unlikely that the training finds the solution x = y.
More generally, assume that T has a non-trivial null space, namely there exists a signed measure
n 6= 0 such that T n = 0, that is, n is in the null space of T . Equivalently, T is not invertible, because
n cannot be recovered from T n. Then, x = y + αn for any α ∈ R satisfies Eq. 7. Therefore non-
invertibility of T implies that measures in its null space may freely leak into the learned distribution
(as long as the sum remains a valid probability distribution that assigns non-negative mass to all sets).
Conversely, assume that some x 6= y satisfies Eq. 7. Then T (x− y) = T y − T y = 0, so x− y is
in null space of T and therefore T is not invertible.
Therefore, leaking augmentations imply non-invertibility of the augmentation operator, which con-
versely implies the central principle: if the augmentation operator T is invertible, it does not
leak. Such a non-leaking operator further satisfies the requirements of Lemma 5.1. of Bora et al. [4],
where the invertibility is shown to imply that a GAN learns the correct distribution.
The invertibility has an intuitive interpretation: the training process can implicitly “undo” the
augmentations, as long as probability mass is merely shifted around and not squashed flat.
C.3 Compositions and mixtures
We only access the operator T indirectly: it is implemented as a procedure, rather than a matrix-like
entity whose null space we could study directly (even if we know that such a thing exists in principle).
Showing invertibility for an arbitrary procedure is likely to be impossible. Rather, we adopt a
constructive approach, and build our augmentation pipeline from combinations of simple known-safe
augmentations, in a way that can be shown to not leak. This calls for two components: a set of
combination rules that preserve the non-leaking guarantee, and a set of elementary augmentations
that have this property. In this subsection we address the former.
By elementary linear algebra: assume T and U are invertible. Then the composition T U is invert-
ible, as is any finite chain of such compositions. Hence, sequential composition of non-leaking
augmentations is non-leaking. We build our pipeline on this observation.
The other obvious combination of augmentations is obtained by probabilistic mixtures: given
invertible augmentations T and U , perform T with probability α and U with probability 1 − α.
The operator corresponding to this augmentation is the “pointwise” convex blend αT + (1− α)U .
More generally, one can mix e.g. a continuous family of augmentations Tφ with weights given by
a non-negative unit-sum function α(φ), as
∫
α(φ)Tφ dφ. Unfortunately, stochastically choosing
among a set of augmentations is not guaranteed to preserve the non-leaking property, and must
be analyzed case by case (which is the content of the next subsection). To see this, consider an
multiplication of probability distributions in this sense (as opposed to e.g. addition of random variables), unless
otherwise noted.
Technically, one can consider the vector space of finite signed measures on RN , which is a Banach space
under the Total Variation norm. Markov operators form a convex subset of linear operators acting on this space,
and general linear combinations thereof form a subspace (and a subalgebra). The exact mathematical conditions
under which some of the following findings apply may be intricate but have limited practical significance given
the approximate nature of GAN training.
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extremely simple discrete probability space with only two elements. The augmentation operator
T = ( 0 11 0 ) flips the elements. Mixed with probability α = 12 with the identity augmentation I
(which keeps the distribution unchanged), we obtain the augmentation 12T + 12I = 12
(
1 1
1 1
)
which
is a singular matrix and therefore not invertible. Intuitively, this operator smears any probability
distribution into a degenerate equidistribution, from which the original can no longer be recovered.
Similar considerations carry over to arbitrarily complicated linear operators.
C.4 Non-leaking elementary augmentations
In the following, we construct several examples of relatively large classes of elementary augmentations
that do not leak and can therefore be used to form a chain of augmentations. Importantly, most of
these classes are not inherently safe, as they are stochastic mixtures of even simpler augmentations,
as discussed above. However, in many cases we can show that the degenerate situation only arises
with specific choices of mixture distribution, which we can then avoid.
Specifically, for every type of augmentation, we identify a configuration where applying it with
probability strictly less than 1 results in an invertible transformation. From the standpoint of this
analysis, we interpret this stochastic skipping as modifying the augmentation operator itself, in a
way that boosts the probability of leaving the input unchanged and reduces the probability of other
outcomes.
C.4.1 Deterministic mappings
The simplest form of augmentation is a deterministic mapping, where the operator Tf assigns to
every image X a unique image f(X). In the most general setting f is any measurable function and
Tfx is the corresponding pushforward measure. When f is a diffeomorphism, Tf acts by the usual
change of variables formula with a density correction by a Jacobian determinant. These mappings are
invertible as long as f itself is invertible. Conversely, if f is not invertible, then neither is Tf .
Here it may be instructive to highlight the difference between f and Tf . The former transforms the
underlying space on which the probability distributions live – for example, if we are dealing with
images of just two pixels (with continuous and unconstrained values), f is a nonlinear “warp” of the
two-dimensional plane. In contrast, Tf operates on distributions defined on this space – think of a
continuous 2-dimensional function (density) on the aforementioned plane. The action of Tf is to
move the density around according to f , while compensating for thinning and concentration of the
mass due to stretching. As long as f maps every distinct point to a distinct point, this warp can be
reversed.
An important special case is that where f is a linear transformation of the space. Then the invertibility
of Tf becomes a simpler question of the invertibility of a finite-dimensional matrix that represents f .
Note that when an invertible deterministic transformation is skipped probabilistically, the determin-
ism is lost, and very specific choices of transformation could result in non-invertibility (see e.g.
the example of flipping above). We only use deterministic mappings as building blocks of other
augmentations, and never apply them in isolation with stochastic skipping.
C.4.2 Transformation group augmentations
Many commonly used augmentations are built from transformations that act as a group under
sequential composition. Examples of this are flips, translations, rotations, scalings, shears, and many
color and intensity transformations. We show that a stochastic mixture of transformations within
a finitely generated abelian group is non-leaking as long as the mixture weights are chosen from a
non-degenerate distribution.
As an example, the four deterministic augmentations {R0,R90,R180,R270} that rotate the images
to every one of the 90-degree increment orientations constitute a group. This is seen by checking
that the set satisfies the axiomatic definition of a group. Specifically, the set is closed, as composing
two of elements always results in an element of the same set, e.g. R270R180 = R90. It is also
obviously associative, and has an identity elementR0 = I . Finally, every element has an inverse, e.g.
R−190 = R270. We can now simply speak of powers of the single generator element, whereby the four
group elements are written as {R090,R190,R290,R390} and further (as well as negative) powers “wrap
over” to the same elements. This group is isomorphic to Z4, the additive group of integers modulo 4.
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A group of rotations is compact due to the wrap-over effect. An example of a non-compact group is
that of translations (with non-periodic boundary conditions): compositions of translations are still
translations, but one cannot wrap over. Furthermore, more than one generator element can be present
(e.g. y-translation in addition to x-translation), but we require that these commute, i.e. the order of
applying the transformations must not matter (in which case the group is called abelian).
Similar considerations extend to continuous Lie groups, e.g. that of rotations by any angle; here the
generating element is replaced by an infinitesimal generator from the corresponding Lie algebra,
and the discrete powers by the continuous exponential mapping. For example, continuous rotation
transformations are isomorphic to the group SO(2), or U(1).
In the following subsections show that for finitely generated abelian groups whose identity el-
ement matches the identity augmentation, stochastic mixtures of augmentations within the
group are invertible, as long as the appropriate Fourier transform of the probability distribu-
tion over the elements has no zeros.
Discrete compact one-parameter groups We demonstrate the key points in detail with the simple
but relevant case of a discrete compact one-parameter group and generalize later. Let G be a
deterministic augmentation that generates the finite cyclic group {Gi}N−1i=0 of order N (e.g. the four
90-degree rotations above), such that the element G0 is the identity mapping that leaves its input
unchanged.
Consider a stochastic augmentation T that randomly applies an element of the group, with the
probability of choosing each element given by the probability vector p ∈ RN (where p is nonnegative
and sums to 1):
T =
N−1∑
i=0
piGi (8)
To show the conditions for invertibility of T , we build an operator U that explicitly inverts T , namely
UT = I = G0. Whenever this is possible, T is invertible and non-leaking. We build U from the
same group elements with a different weighting4 vector q ∈ RN :
U =
N−1∑
j=0
qjGj (9)
We now seek a vector q for which UT = I, that is, for which U is the desired inverse. Now,
UT =
(
N−1∑
i=0
piGi
)N−1∑
j=0
qjGj
 (10)
=
N−1∑
i,j=0
piqjGi+j (11)
The powers of the group operation, as well as the indices of the weight vectors, are taken as modulo
N due to the cyclic wrap-over of the group element. Collecting the terms that correspond to each Gk
in this range and changing the indexing accordingly, we arrive at:
=
N−1∑
k=0
[
N−1∑
l=0
plqk−l
]
Gk (12)
=
N−1∑
k=0
[p⊗ q]kGk (13)
4Unlike with p, there is no requirement for q to represent a nonnegative probability density that sums to 1, as
we are establishing the general invertibility of T without regard to its probabilistic interpretation. Note that U is
never actually constructed or evaluated when applying our method in practice, and does not need to represent
an operation that can be algorithmically implemented; our interest is merely to identify the conditions for its
existence.
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where we observe that the multiplier in front of each Gk is given by the cyclic convolution of the
elements of the vectors p and q. This can be written as a pointwise product in terms of the Discrete
Fourier Transform F, denoting the DFT’s of p and q by a hat:
=
N−1∑
k=0
[F−1(pˆ qˆ)]kGk (14)
To recover the sought after inverse, assuming every element of pˆ is nonzero, we set qˆi = 1pˆi for all i:
=
N−1∑
k=0
[F−1(pˆ pˆ−1)]kGk (15)
=
N−1∑
k=0
[F−11]kGk (16)
= G0 (17)
= I (18)
Here, we take advantage of the fact that the inverse DFT of a constant vector of ones is the vector
[1, 0, ..., 0].
In summary, the product of U and T effectively computes a convolution between their respective
group element weights. This convolution assigns all of the weight to the identity element precisely
when one has qˆi = 1pˆi , for all i, whereby U is the inverse of T . This inverse only exists when the
Fourier transform pˆi of the augmentation probability weights has no zeros.
The intuition is that the mixture of group transformations “smears” probability mass among the
different transformed versions of the distribution. Analogously to classical deconvolution, this
smearing can be undone (“deconvolved”) as long as the convolution does not destroy any frequencies
by scaling them to zero.
Some noteworthy consequences of this are:
• Assume p is a constant vector 1N 1, that is, the augmentation applies the group elements with
uniform probability. In this case pˆ = δ0 and convolution with any zero-mean weight vector
is zero. This case is almost certain to cause leaks of the group elements themselves. To see
this directly, the mixed augmentation operator is now T := 1N
∑N−1
j=0 Gj . Consider the true
distribution of training samples y, and a version y′ = Gky into which some element of the
transformation group has leaked. Now,
T y′ = T (Gky) = 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
GjGky = 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
Gj+ky = 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
Gjy = T y (19)
(recalling the modulo arithmetic in the group powers). By Eq. 7, this is a leak, and the
training may equally well learn the distribution Gky rather than y. By the same reasoning,
any mixture of transformed elements may be learned (possibly even a different one for each
image).
• Similarly, if p is periodic (with period that is some integer factor of N , other than N itself),
the Fourier transform is a sparse sequence of spikes separated by zeros. Another viewpoint
to this is that the group has a subgroup, whose elements are chosen uniformly. Similar to
above, this is almost certain to cause leaks with elements of that subgroup.
• With more sporadic zero patterns, the leaks can be seen as “conditional”: while the augmen-
tation operator has a null space, it is not generally possible to write an equivalent of Eq. 19
without setting conditions on the distribution y itself. In these cases, leaks only occur for
specific kinds of distributions, e.g., when a sufficient amount of group symmetry is already
present in the distribution itself.
For example, consider a dataset where all four 90 degree orientations of any image are
equally likely, and an augmentation that performs either a 0 or 90 degree rotation at equal
probability. This corresponds to the probability vector p = [0.5, 0.5, 0, 0] over the four
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elements of the 90-degree rotation group. This distribution has a single zero in its Fourier
transform. The associated leak might manifest as the generator only learning to produce
images in orientations 0 and 180 degrees, and relying on the augmentation to fill the gaps.
Clearly, this kind of a leak could not happen in e.g. a dataset depicting upright faces, and
the failure of invertibility would be harmless in this case.
In our augmentations involving compact groups (rotations and flips), we always choose the elements
with a uniform probability, but importantly, only perform the augmentation with some probability
less than one. This combination can be viewed as increasing the probability of choosing the group
identity element. The probability vector p is then constant, except for having a higher value at p0; the
Fourier transform of such a vector has no zeros.
Non-compact discrete one-parameter groups The above reasoning can be extended to groups
which are not compact, in particular translations by integer offsets (without periodic boundaries).
In the discrete case, such a group is necessarily isomorphic to the additive group Z of all integers, and
no modulo integer arithmetic is performed. The mixture density is then a two-sided sequence {pi}
with i ∈ Z, and the appropriate Fourier transform maps this to a periodic function. By an analogous
reasoning with the previous subsection, the invertibility holds as long as this spectrum has no zeros.
Continuous one-parameter groups With suitable technical care, these arguments can be extended
to continuous groups with elements Gφ indexed by a continuous parameter φ. In the compact case
(e.g. continuous rotation), the group elements wrap over at some period L, such that Gφ+L = Gφ.
In the non-compact case (e.g. translation (addition) and scaling (multiplication) by real-valued
amounts) no such wrap-over occurs. The compact and non-compact groups are isomorphic to U(1),
and the additive group R, respectively. Stochastic mixtures of these group elements are expressed by
probability density functions p(φ), with φ ∈ [0, L) if the group is compact, and φ ∈ R otherwise.
The Fourier transforms are replaced by the appropriate generalizations, and the invertibility holds
when the spectrum has no zeros.
Here it is important to use the correct parametrization of the group. Note that one could in principle
parametrize e.g. rotations in arbitrary ways, and it may seem ambiguous as to what parametrization
to use, which would appear to render concepts like uniform distribution meaningless. The issue
arises when replacing the sums in the earlier formulas with integrals, whereby one needs to choose
a measure of integration. These findings apply specifically to the natural Haar measure and the
associated parametrization – essentially, the measure that accumulates at constant rate when taking
small steps in the group by applying the infinitesimal generator. For rotation groups, the usual “area”
measure over the angular parametrization coincides with the Haar measure, and therefore e.g. uniform
distribution is taken to mean that all angles are chosen equally likely. For translation, the natural
Euclidian distance is the correct parametrization. For other groups, such as scaling, the choice is a
bit more nuanced: when composing scaling operations, the scale factor combines by multiplication
instead of addition, so the natural parametrization is the logarithm of the scale factor.
For continuous compact groups (rotation), we use the same scheme as in the discrete case: uniform
probability mixed with identity at a probability greater than zero.
For continuous non-compact groups, the Fourier transform of the normal distribution has no zeros
and results in an invertible augmentation when used to choose among the group elements. Other
distributions with this property are at least the α-stable and more generally the infinitely divisible
family of distributions. When the parametrization is logarithmic, we may instead use exponentiated
values from these distributions (e.g. the log-normal distribution). Finally, stochastically mixing
zero-mean normal distributed variables with identity does not introduce zeros to the FT, as it merely
lifts the already positive values of the spectrum.
Multi-parameter abelian groups Finally, these findings generalize to groups that are products of a
finite number of single-parameter groups, provided that the elements of the different groups commute
among each other (in other words, finitely generated abelian groups). An example of this is the group
of 2-dimensional translations obtained by considering x- and y-translations simultaneously.5
5However, for example the non-abelian group of 3-dimensional rotations, SO(3), is not obtained as a product
of the single-parameter “Euler angle” rotations along three axes, and therefore is not covered by the present
formulation of our theory. The reason is that the three different rotations do not commute. One may of course
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The Fourier transforms are replaced with suitable multi-dimensional generalizations, and the proba-
bility distributions and their Fourier transforms obtain multidimensional domains accordingly.
Discussion Invertibility is a sufficient condition to ensure the absence of leaks. However, it may
not always be necessary: in the case of non-compact groups, a hypothesis could be made that even a
technically non-invertible operator does not leak. For example, a shift augmentation with uniform
distributed offset on a continuous interval is not invertible, as the Fourier transform of its density is a
sinc function with periodic zeros (except at 0). This only allows for leaks of zero-mean functions
whose FT is supported on this evenly spaced set of frequencies – in other words, infinitely periodic
functions. Even though such functions are in the null space of the augmentation operator, they
cannot be added to any density in an infinite domain without violating non-negativity, and so we
may hypothesize that no leak can in fact occur. In practice, however, the near-zero spectrum values
might allow for a periodic leak modulated by a wide window function to occur for very specific (and
possibly contrived) data distributions.
In contrast, straightforward examples and practical demonstrations of leaks are easily found for
compact groups, e.g. with uniform or periodic rotations.
C.4.3 Noise and image filter augmentations
We refer to Theorem 5.3. of Bora et al. [4], where it is shown that in a setting effectively identical to
ours, addition of noise that is independent of the image is an invertible operation as long as the
Fourier spectrum of the noise distribution does not contain zeros. The reason is that addition of
mutually independent random variables results in a convolution of their probability distributions.
Similar to groups, this is a multiplication in the Fourier domain, and the zeros correspond to
irrevocable loss of information, making the inversion impossible. The inverse can be realized by
“deconvolution”, or division in the Fourier domain.
A potential source of confusion is that the Fourier transform is commonly used to describe spatial
correlations of noise in signal processing. We refer to a different concept, namely the Fourier
transform of the probability density of the noise, often called the characteristic function in probability
literature (although correlated noise is also subsumed by this analysis).
Gaussian product noise In our setting, we also randomize the magnitude parameter of the noise,
in effect stochastically mixing between different noise distributions. The above analysis subsumes
this case, as the mixture is also a random noise, with a density that is a weighted blend between the
densities of the base noises. However, the noise is no longer independent across points, so its joint
distribution is no longer separable to a product of marginals, and one must consider the joint Fourier
transform in full dimension.
Specifically, we draw the per-pixel noise from a normal distribution and modulate this entire noise
field by a multiplication with a single (half-)normal random number. The resulting distribution has
an everywhere nonzero Fourier transform and hence is invertible. To see this, first consider two
standard normal distributed random scalars X and Y , and their product Z = XY (taken in the
sense of multiplying the random variables, not the densities). Then Z is distributed according to
the density pZ(Z) =
K0(|Z|)
pi , where K0 is a modified Bessel function, and has the characteristic
function (Fourier transform) pˆZ(ω) = 1√ω2+1 , which is everywhere positive [43].
Then, considering our situation with a product of a normal distributed scalar X and an independent
normal distributed vector Y ∈ RN , the N entries of the product Z = XY become mutually
dependent. The marginal distribution of each entry is nevertheless exactly the above product
distribution pZ . By Fourier slice theorem, all one-dimensional slices through the main axes of the
characteristic function of Z must then coincide with the characteristic function pˆZ of this marginal
distribution. Finally, because the joint distribution is radially symmetric, so is the characteristic
function, and this must apply to all slices through the origin, yielding the everywhere positive Fourier
transform pˆZ(ω) = 1√|ω|2+1 . When stochastically mixed with identity (as is our random skipping
procedure), the Fourier Transform values are merely lifted towards 1 and no new zero-crossings are
introduced.
still freely compose the three single-parameter rotation augmentations in sequence, but note that the combined
effect can only induce a subset of possible probability distributions on SO(3).
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Additive noise in transformed bases Similar notes apply to additive noise in a different basis: one
can consider the noise augmentation as being flanked by an invertible deterministic (possibly also
nonlinear) basis transformation and its inverse. It then suffices to show that the additive noise has a
non-zero spectrum in isolation. In particular, multiplicative noise with a non-negative distribution
can be viewed as additive noise in logarithmic space and is invertible if the logarithmic version of the
noise distribution has no zeros in its Fourier transform. The image-space filters are a combination
of a linear basis transformation to the wavelet basis, and additive Gaussian noise under a non-linear
logarithmic transformation.
C.4.4 Random projection augmentations
The cutout augmentation (as well as e.g. the pixel and patch blocking in AmbientGAN [4]) can be
interpreted as projecting a random subset of the dimensions to zero.
Let P1,P2, ...,PN be a set of deterministic projection augmentation operators with the defining
property that P2j = Pj . For example, each one of these operators can set a different fixed rectangular
region to zero. Clearly the individual projections have a null space (unless they are the identity
projection) and they are not invertible in isolation.
Consider a stochastic augmentation that randomly applies one of these projections, or the identity.
Let p0, p1, ..., pN denote the discrete probabilities of choosing the identity operator I for p0, and
Pk for the remaining pk. Define the mixture of the projections as:
T = p0I +
N∑
j=1
pjPj (20)
Again, T is a mixture of operators, however unlike in earlier examples, some (but not all) of the
operators are non-invertible. Under what conditions on the probability distribution p is T invertible?
Assume that T is not invertible, i.e. there exists a probability distribution x 6= 0 such that T x = 0.
Then
0 = T x = p0x+
N∑
j=1
pjPjx (21)
and rearranging,
N∑
j=1
pjPjx = −p0x (22)
Under reasonable technical assumptions (e.g. discreteness of the pixel intensity values, such as
justified in Theorem 5.4. of Bora et al. [4]), we can consider the inner product of both sides of this
equation with x:
N∑
j=1
pj〈x,Pjx〉 = −p0〈x,x〉 (23)
The right side of this equation is strictly negative if the probability p0 of identity is greater than
zero, as x 6= 0. The left side is a non-negative sum of non-negative terms, as the inner product
of a vector with its projection is non-negative. Therefore, the assumption leads to a contradiction
unless p0 = 0; conversely, random projection augmentation does not leak if there is a non-zero
probability that it produces the identity.
C.5 Practical considerations
C.5.1 Conditioning
In practical numerical computation, an operator that is technically invertible may nevertheless be so
close to a non-invertible configuration that inversion fails in practice. Assuming a finite state space,
this notion is captured by the condition number, which is infinite when the matrix is singular, and
large when it is singular for all practical purposes. The same consideration applies to infinite state
spaces, but the appropriate technical notion of conditioning is less clear.
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The practical value of the analysis in this section is in identifying the conditions where exact non-
invertibility happens, so that appropriate safety margin can be kept. We achieve this by regulating the
probability p of performing a given augmentation, and keeping it at a safe distance from p = 1 which
for many of the augmentations corresponds to a non-invertible condition (e.g. uniform distribution
over compact group elements).
For example, consider applying transformations from a finite group with a uniform probability
distribution, where the augmentation is applied with probability p. In a finite state space, a matrix
corresponding to this augmentation has 1 − p for its smallest singular value, and 1 for the largest,
resulting in condition number 1/(1− p) which approaches infinity as p approaches one.
C.5.2 Pixel-level effects and boundaries
When dealing with images represented on finite pixel grids, naive practical implementations of some
of the group transformations do not strictly speaking form groups. For example, a composition of
two continuous rotations of an image with angles φ and θ does not usually reproduce the same image
as a single rotation by angle φ + θ, due to the necessity of resampling the transformed image to
the rectangular pixel grid twice. Furthermore, parts of the image may fall outside the boundaries
of the grid, whereby their values are lost and cannot be restored even if a reverse transformation is
made afterwards, unless special care is taken. These effects may become significant when multiple
transformations are composed.
In our implementation, we mitigate these issues as much as possible by accumulating the chain of
transformations into a matrix and a vector representing the total affine transformation implemented
by all the grouped augmentations, and only then applying it on the image. This is possible because
all the augmentations we use are affine transformations in the image (or color) space. Furthermore,
prior to applying the geometric transformations, the images are reflection padded and scaled to
double resolution (and conversely, cropped and downscaled afterwards). Effectively the image is
then treated as an infinite tiling of suitably reflected finer-resolution copies of itself, and a practical
target-resolution crop is only sampled at augmentation time.
D Implementation details
We implemented our techniques on top of the official TensorFlow implementation of StyleGAN26.
We kept most of the details unchanged, including network architectures [20], weight demodulation
[20], path length regularization [20], lazy regularization [20], style mixing regularization [19], bilinear
filtering in all up/downsampling layers [19], equalized learning rate for all trainable parameters [18],
minibatch standard deviation layer at the end of the discriminator [18], exponential moving average
of generator weights [18], non-saturating logistic loss [13] with R1 regularization [28], and Adam
optimizer [22] with β1 = 0, β2 = 0.99, and  = 10−8.
We ran our experiments on a computing cluster with a few dozen NVIDIA DGX-1s, each containing
8 Tesla V100 GPUs, using TensorFlow 1.14.0, PyTorch 1.1.0 (for comparison methods), CUDA 10.0,
and cuDNN 7.6.3. We used the official pre-trained Inception network7 to compute FID, KID, and
Inception score.
D.1 Hyperparameters and training configurations
Figure 22 shows the hyperparameters that we used in our experiments, as well as the original
StyleGAN2 config F [20]. We performed all training runs using 8 GPUs and continued the training
until the discriminator had seen a total of 25M real images, except for CIFAR-10, where we used
2 GPUs and 100M images. We used minibatch size of 64 when possible, but reverted to 32 for
METFACES in order to avoid running out of GPU memory.
Dataset augmentation We did not use dataset augmentation in any of our experiments with
FFHQ, LSUN CAT, or CIFAR-10, except for the FFHQ-140k case and in Figure 18. In particular,
we feel that leaky augmentations are inappropriate for CIFAR-10 given its status as a standard
6https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan2
7http://download.tensorflow.org/models/image/imagenet/inception-2015-12-05.tgz
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Parameter StyleGAN2config F
Our
baseline
BreCaHAD,
AFHQ Dog MetFaces CIFAR-10 + Tuning
Resolution 1024×1024 256×256 512×512 1024×1024 32×32 32×32
Number of GPUs 8 8 8 8 2 2
Training length 25M 25M 25M 25M 100M 100M
Minibatch size 32 64 64 32 64 64
Dataset x-flips X/ – – X X – –
Feature maps 1× 12× 1× 1× 512 512
Learning rate η×103 2 2.5 2.5 2 2.5 2.5
R1 regularization γ 10 1 0.5 2 0.01 0.01
G moving average 10k 20k 20k 10k 20k 20k
Mixed-precision – X X X X X
LR rampdown – – – – 50M 50M
Mapping net depth 8 8 8 8 8 2
Style mixing reg. X X X X X –
Path length reg. X X X X X –
Resnet D X X X X X –
Figure 22: Hyperparameters used in each experiment.
benchmark dataset, where dataset/leaky augmentations would unfairly inflate the results. METFACES,
BRECAHAD, and AFHQ DOG are horizontally symmetric in nature, so we chose to enable dataset
x-flips for these datasets to maximize result quality.
Network capacity We follow the original StyleGAN2 configuration for high-resolution datasets
(≥ 5122): a layer operating on N = w × h pixels uses min (216/√N, 512) feature maps. With
CIFAR-10 we use 512 feature maps for all layers. In the 256× 256 configuration used with FFHQ
and LSUN CAT, we facilitate extensive sweeps over dataset sizes by decreasing the number of
feature maps to min
(
215/
√
N, 512
)
.
Learning rate and weight averaging We selected the optimal learning rates using grid search and
found that it is generally beneficial to use the highest learning rate that does not result in training
instability. We also found that larger minibatch size allows for a slightly higher learning rate. For the
moving average of generator weights [18], the natural choice is to parameterize the decay rate with
respect to minibatches — not individual images — so that increasing the minibatch size results in a
longer decay.
R1 regularization Karras et al. [20] postulated that the best choice for theR1 regularization weight
γ is highly dependent on the dataset. We thus performed extensive grid search for each column in
Figure 22, considering γ ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.005, . . . , 20, 50, 100}. Although the optimal γ does vary
wildly, from 0.01 to 10, it seems to scale almost linearly with the resolution of the dataset. Thus, we
could have avoided most of the grid search by rewriting γ = γ0×N , whereN = w×h is the number
of pixels in the images. The optimal values for γ0 were rather tightly packed in [1× 10−6, 2× 10−5].
We recommend parameterizing γ in this way in future work, with the default value of γ0 = 10−5.
Mixed-precision training We utilize the high-performance Tensor Cores available in Volta-class
GPUs by employing mixed-precision FP16/FP32 training in all of our experiments (with two ex-
ceptions, discussed in Appendix D.2). We store the trainable parameters with full FP32 precision
for the purposes of optimization but cast them to FP16 before evaluating G and D. The main
challenge with mixed-precision training is that the numerical range of FP16 is limited to ∼ ±216, as
opposed to ∼ ±2128 for FP32. Thus, any unexpected spikes in signal magnitude — no matter how
transient — will immediately collapse the training dynamics. We found that the risk of such spikes
can be reduced drastically using three tricks: first, by limiting the use of FP16 to only the 4 highest
resolutions, i.e., layers for which Nlayer ≥ Ndataset/(2× 2)4; second, by pre-normalizing the style
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vector s and each row of the weight tensor w before applying weight modulation and demodulation8;
and third, by clamping the output of every convolutional layer to ±28, i.e., an order of magnitude
wider range than is needed in practice. We observed about 60% end-to-end speedup from using FP16
and verified that the results were virtually identical to FP32 on our baseline configuration.
CIFAR-10 We enable class-conditional image generation on CIFAR-10 by extending the original
StyleGAN2 architecture as follows. For the generator, we embed the class identifier into a 512-
dimensional vector that we add to the raw output of the first mapping layer, before the leaky ReLU
activation. For the discriminator, we follow the approach of Miyato and Koyama [30] by evaluating
the final discriminator output asD(x) = embed(c) ·D′(x)T , where c is the class identifier andD′(x)
corresponds to the feature vector produced by the last layer of D. As illustrated in Figures 8c and 22,
we found that we can improve the FID considerably by disabling style mixing regularization [19],
path length regularization [20], and residual connections in D [20]. Note that all of these features are
highly beneficial on higher-resolution datasets such as FFHQ. We find it somewhat alarming that
they have precisely the opposite effect on CIFAR-10 — this suggests that some previous conclusions
reached in the literature using CIFAR-10 may fail to generalize to other datasets.
D.2 Comparison methods
We implemented the comparison methods shown in Figures 8a and 14a on top of our baseline config-
uration, identifying the best-performing hyperparameters for each method via extensive grid search.
Furthermore, we inspected the resulting network weights and training dynamics in detail to verify
correct behavior, e.g., that with the discriminator indeed learns to correctly handle the auxiliary tasks
with PA-GAN and auxiliary rotations. We found zCR and WGAN-GP to be inherently incompatible
with our mixed-precision training setup due to their large variation in gradient magnitudes. We
thus reverted to full-precision FP32 for these methods. Similarly, we found lazy regularization
to be incompatible with bCR, zCR, WGAN-GP, and auxiliary rotations. Thus, we included their
corresponding loss terms directly into our main training loss, evaluated on every minibatch.
bCR We implement balanced consistency regularization proposed by Zhao et al. [49] by introducing
two new loss terms as shown in Figure 2a. We set λreal = λfake = 10 and use integer translations on
the range of [−8,+8] pixels. In Figure 18, we also perform experiments with x-flips and arbitrary
rotations.
zCR In addition to bCR, Zhao et al. [49] also propose latent consistency regularization (zCR) to
improve the diversity of the generated images. We implement zCR by perturbing each component of
the latent z by σnoise = 0.1 and encouraging the generator to maximize the L2 difference between the
generated images, measured as an average over the pixels, with weight λgen = 0.02. Similarly, we
encourage the discriminator to minimize the L2 difference in D(x) with weight λdis = 0.2.
PA-GAN Zhang and Khoreva [45] propose to reduce overfitting by requiring the discriminator
to learn an auxiliary checksum task. This is done by providing a random bit string as additional
input to D, requiring that the sign of the output is flipped based on the parity of bits that were set,
and dynamically increasing the number of bits when overfitting is detected. We select the number
of bits using our rt heuristic with target 0.95. Given the value of p produced by the heuristic, we
calculate the number of bits as k = dp · 16e. Similar to Zhang and Khoreva, we fade in the effect
of newly added bits smoothly over the course of training. In practice, we use a fixed string of
16 bits, where the first k − 1 bits are sampled from Bernoulli(0.5), the kth bit is sampled from
Bernoulli
(
min(p · 16− k + 1, 0.5)), and the remaining 16− k bits are set to zero.
WGAN-GP For WGAN-GP, proposed by Gulrajani et al. [14], we reuse the existing implementa-
tion included in the StyleGAN2 codebase with λ = 10. We found WGAN-GP to be quite unstable
in our baseline configuration, which necessitated us to disable mixed-precision training and lazy
regularization, as well as to settle for a considerably lower learning rate η = 0.0010.
8Note that our pre-normalization only affects the intermediate results; it has no effect on the final output of
the convolution layer due to the subsequent post-normalization performed by weight demodulation.
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Auxiliary rotations Chen et al. [6] propose to improve GAN training by introducing an auxiliary
rotation loss for G and D. In addition the main training objective, the discriminator is shown real
images augmented with 90◦ rotations and asked to detect their correct orientation. Similarly, the
generator is encouraged to produce images whose orientation is easy for the discriminator to detect
correctly. We implement this method by introducing two new loss terms that are evaluated on a 4×
larger minibatch, consisting of rotated versions of the images shown to the discriminator as a part of
the main loss. We extend the last layer of D to output 5 scalar values instead of one and interpret the
last 4 components as raw logits for softmax cross-entropy loss. We weight the additional loss terms
using α = 10 for G, and β = 5 for D.
Spectral normalization Miyato et al. [29] propose to regularize the discriminator by explicitly
enforcing an upper bound for its Lipschitz constant, and several follow-up works [46, 5, 49, 36] have
found it to be beneficial. Given that spectral normalization is effectively a no-op when applied to
the StyleGAN2 generator [20], we apply it only to the discriminator. We ported the original Chainer
implementation9 to TensorFlow, and applied it to the main convolution layers of D. We found it
beneficial to not use spectral normalization with the FromRGB layer, residual skip connections, or the
last fully-connected layer.
Freeze-D Mo et al. [31] propose to freeze the first k layers of the discriminator to improve results
with transfer learning. We tested several different choices for k, and found k = 10 to consistently
give the best results in all cases. In practice, this corresponds to freezing all layers operating at the 3
highest resolutions, i.e., layers for which Nlayer ≥ Ndataset/(2× 2)3.
BigGAN BigGAN results in Figures 17 and 16 were run on a modified version of the original
BigGAN PyTorch implementation10. The implementation was adapted for unconditional operation
following Schönfeld et al. [36] by matching their hyperparameters, replacing class-conditional
BatchNorm with self-modulation, where the BatchNorm parameters are conditioned only on the
latent vector z, and not using class projection in the discriminator.
Mapping network depth For the “Shallow mapping” case in Figure 8a, we reduced the depth of
the mapping network from 8 to 2. Reducing the depth further than 2 yielded consistently inferior
results, confirming the usefulness of the mapping network.
Adaptive dropout Dropout [40] is a well-known technique for combating overfitting in practically
all areas of machine learning. In Figure 8a, we employ multiplicative Gaussian dropout for all layers
of the discriminator, similar to the approach employed by Karras et al. [18] in the context of LSGAN
loss [26]. We adjust the standard deviation dynamically using our rt heuristic with target 0.6, so that
the resulting p is used directly as the value for σ.
D.3 MetFaces dataset
We have collected a new dataset, MetFaces, by extracting images of human faces from the Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art online collection. Dataset images were searched using terms such as ‘paintings’,
‘watercolor’ and ‘oil on canvas’, and downloaded via the https://metmuseum.github.io/ API. This
resulted in a set of source images that depicted paintings, drawings, and statues. Various automated
heuristics, such as face detection and image quality metrics, were used to narrow down the set
of images to contain only human faces. A manual selection pass over the remaining images was
performed to weed out poor quality images not caught by automated filtering. Finally, faces were
cropped and aligned to produce 1,336 high quality images at 10242 resolution.
The whole dataset, including the unprocessed images, is available at
https://github.com/NVlabs/metfaces-dataset
9https://github.com/pfnet-research/sngan_projection
10https://github.com/ajbrock/BigGAN-PyTorch
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